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COMPENSABLE AGGRAVATION AND ACCELERATION
OF PRE-EXISTING INFIRMITIES UNDER
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.
KURT GARVE*
Maxon v. Swift & Co.' was a case of workmen's compensa-
tion litigation. The employee, deceased, had always been well
prior to his calamity, save for some hardening of his arteries
and high-blood pressure. While in the due performance of his
duties he fell about 8 feet striking the concrete floor and injur-
ing his back and head. After the accident he had a lump on
his head in its left lower region, no longer had control of his
legs and fell down on frequent occasions. He also complained
of dizziness, pain in the back of his head and of black spots
floating before his eyes. One of the vertebrae had been factured.
He died fifteen months later. An autopsy revealed a recent
hemorrhage in the brain substance, hardening of the arteries in
an advanced stage having existed .already prior to his accident.
An examination of the inner surface of the skull showed that
it had been fractured in the region of its left lower wall, and
that the external lump, fracture and hemorrhage corresponded
in their locations with one another.
It was defendant company's contention that the hardening
of the arteries and the high-blood pressure had been the cause
of deceased's dizziness and inability to keep on his feet, that
the stroke which occurred fifteen months later was the culmina-
tion of a pre-existing disease, independent of the employment,
and that the long interval of time intervening between injury
and death removed the basis for any inference that there was a
causal connection between the employee's death and injury due
to his employment. Claimants on the other hand contended
that there was such causal connection. The Industrial Commis.
sion adopted claimants's view and awarded compensation. It
was from this order that appeal was brought. Affirmed.
* Member of the California Bar; M. D., University of Berlin, 1922.
Now engaged in practice and research in medical jurisprudence. Author
of numerous articles in medical and legal periodicals.
1158 Minn. 491, 198 N. W. 133 (1924).
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Was the decision of the commission correct? When are
aggravations and accelerations of pre-existing infirmities com-
pensable under workmen's compensation acts?
A FEw MEDiCAL FACTS
For the medical man the term "pre-existing infirmities"
covers a large territory, ranging from a mere susceptibility to
some ailment to the gravest diseases. For the lawyer, however,
this expression has a very definite and restricted meaning, when
connected with the legal concepts of aggravation or accleration
of a pre-existing disease by reason of the employment. Mnile
all disorders, no matter of what -description, have as to their
nature and activities certain characteristics of their own, they
also have in common certain features which probably most con-
spicuously stand out in the group of infectious diseases. For
instance, it is surprising that, considering the enormous num-
bers of bacteria of the most varied kinds, infection does not
occur so often as one may be inclined to believe, even though a
large area of the body has been subjected to traumatic injury.
Not that bacterial invasion is of infrequent occurrence; quite
on the contrary. But in health germs do not usually cause in-
fection and tend to be destroyed very soon after their having
entered the tissues. And, even though bacteria invaded the
body and established themselves in such a manner that a disease
comes into existence, nevertheless they are overcome sooner or
later by the defensive forces of the body mobolized to counteract
their effects. We may, therefore, divide the defence mechanism
of the body into three different forces: the forces of prevention
of its:
a.) Invasion by germs;
b.) infection by them;
c.) progress of infection, where bacteria have gotten a
stronghold of the body.2
It is a consideration of the degrees of presence or absence
of sufficiency of the forces of the last class which enters a work-
men's compensation case in which compensability of an aggra-
vation or acceleration of a pre-existing disease is at issue. It is
2"Infection, Immunity and Biologic Therapy," by Kolmer, 1924,
p. 65 et seq. (W. B. Saunders Company, Philadelphia & London).
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in connection with such cases that terms such as dormant, active,
and latent diseases receive their greatest significance and im-
portance.
a.) Active Diseases.
Where the forces of prevention of progress of the disease
are very weak, and the bacteria or other pathologic agencies
have the upper hand, the disorder is active. Progress of the dis-
order may be slow or quick, temporary or permanent, until the
final stage is reached.
b.) Arrested Disorders.
On the other hand, where the forces of prevention of
progress have overcome definitely the vulnerating actions of the
invading bacteria, the disease is at least arrested. There is no
further progress. The person afflicted does not become worse in
his condition. But there may be left a certain susceptibility.
The disorder may flare up at any time and again become active
and progressing, whenever a sufficiently strong trauma to cause
such change is suffered by the diseased.
c.) Dormant or Latent Diseases.
Things are different as to latent or dormant diseases.
Naturally, arrested disorders are dormant. They have the
dormancy of susceptibility, or potentiality of renewal of
activities of the causes of the disorder, whenever favorable con-
ditions are present. But there is another type of dormancy.
The forces of prevention of progress of the disease are some-
what weaker than the vulnerating forces of the bacteria. The
disease is active, but its activity is hidden, non-manifest. The
dormancy is more apparent than real. The process progresses
without obvious manifestations of symptoms, sometimes until
the fatal issue has been reached. "Probably no word in con-
nection with the description of syphilitic processes is more mis-
understood and abused than the expression 'latent syphilis.' As
it is ordinarily used, it does not refer to a condition where, as
a result of immune processes or loss of pathogenicity, the disease
is held in check and is truly latent. On the contrary, in the vast
majority of these cases, it is only syphilis without obvious ex-
ternal manifestations and frequently accompanied by active
pathologic, involvments of the aorta, the meninges, the brain, or
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cord. There seems to be a demand for a term with which to
designate this class of cases and the word 'latent' is misused
to this end. It would seem that a better designation might be
found, such as syphilis without external manifestations, non-
manifest syphilis, repressed syphilis, concealed syphilis, or
endosyphilis. . .. A truly latent syphilis would give a con-
sistently negative Wassermann reaction and would be without
manifestations or active pathologic processes in any organ.' '
VULNERABnITy OF PRE-EXISTnG DISEASES
There are certain diseases which cannot be aggravated by
an industrial accident or injury. Thus, where an employee
sustained a fracture of his right leg and while disabled was com-
mitted to a hospital for the insane, the industrial commission
found after extended medical expert testimony that dementia
praecox is a type of insanity which trauma cannot enter into
either as a direct cause or as a precipitant. It was held that
applicant was entitled to compensation solely for the disability
incident to the fracture.4 Dementia praecox or adolescent in-
sanity is "a group of morbid symptoms occurring at about the
period of sexual development with, in general, a somewhat
characteristic affective type, tending to ultimate dementia with
more or less rapid course."r5 "Kraepelin compares it with a
tree that had sufficient soil for its growth to a certain point and
that when this is exhausted, it fails. The comparison is not an
inapt one and assists in the comprehension of the actual state
of the cause of this disorder. "6
Other diseases are subject to the vulnerating forces of in-
dustrial agencies, so that they may be accelerated or aggravated
up to their fatal termination. Thus, where a cook, suffering
from a pre-existing heart disease, who was employed upon a
lighter where his employment required him to live, made several
trips to and from the deck of the craft when sinking, in an at-
tempt to save some of his belongings and a surveying instru-
ment, died soon thereafter, there was evidence that the exertion
2"Syphilis," by Hazen, 1928, p. 46 (The C. V. Mosby Company, St.
Louis).
'Oliver v. Uniont Iron Works, 5 Cal. I. A. C. D. (1919), 193.
"Practical Manual of Insanity," by Browen-Bannister, 1902, p. 291
('. B. Sounders & Company, Philadelphia& London).
41bidem, p. 293.
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and the excitement incidental thereto so aggravated and acceler-
ated his heart disease as to cause his death.7 And, where a
concrete worker, who prior to his accident was suffering from an
apparently inactive syphilis, was struck on his arm and and
his forehead by a flying piece of concrete, and at the time there
seemed to be only a superficial wound, which, had the employee
been healthy, would have caused but little or no disability, and
where, after a short while, an abscess with other diseased con-
ditions in the head about the point of contact appeared so that
he became disabled, it was held that his disability was due to the
intervention of the industrial accident, and that the infection
had been set into motion and been aggravated by that injury.
8
ELEMENTS OF CHAIN OF EVENTS IN CASFS OF AGGRAVATION OF
PRE-EXISTING INFIRMITIES
Furthermore, quite unique features are to be found in the
chain of causation in cases involving pre-existing disorders as
part of the employee's disability allegedly initiated by his acci-
dent or injury due to the employment. There are a number of
links of the chain of events which are so characteristic for this
class of cases that they deserve mentioning. An analysis of such
chain shows that it consists of:
1.) the industrial vulnerating force, due to the employment;
2.) a primary injury to the employee due to such an in-
dustrial vulnerating force-the original injury per se;
3.) the after-effects of such primary injury which are rea-
sonably immediate in time;
4.) the after-effects which are remote in time;
5.) a pre-existing infirmity;"
But, as the industrial vulnerating force of the original injury
in cases of compensable acceleration or aggravation of a pre-
existing infirmity must by nedessity have also influenced the
disorder, we have in addition the elements of
6.) strength of penetration of the industrial vulnerating
force into the territory of the pre-existing infirmity, and when
arrived at the sphere of influence thereof, not only a vulnerative
in re Brightman, 220 Mass. 17, 107 N. E. 527 (1914).
8 DiccsonG onstruction & Repair Co., et al. v. Beasley, 146 Md. 568,
126 A. 907 (1924).
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capacity, but also a vulnerating effect upon the disease without
interruption of the chain of events;
7.) the effects of the vulnerating force of the primary
injury upon the pre-existing condition;
8.) the after-effects, reasonbly immediate in time, and,
finally,
9.) the after-effects, remote in time.
"EAmAR s" OF ComPENsABais AGGRAVATION OR ACCEUERATION
OF PE-ExIsTING DiSORDER
In considering compensability of aggravation of pre-existing
infirmities two groups of evidentiary facts are met with. The
first class pertains to the proof of the fact that, in all probability,
a culmination of the disorder, independent of the employment,
bad not taken place, while the other group points towards the
aggravation or acceleration by reason of the employment.
1.) IMPROBABILITY OF INDEPENDENT CULMINATION
a.) Apparently in Good Health Prior to the Accident.
While the fact of the workman's apparent good health prior
to the accident does not exclude positively that the pre-existing
disorder was on its way to its culmination quite independently
of the employment, in absence of any indications to the con-
trary, it seems it may be reasonably assumed that but for the
employment and its ensuing accident the infirmity would prob-
ably have remained substantially in the condition it had been
prior to the accident, and that the employee would have con-
tinued to appear healthy and capable of performing his duties in
the same manner as before. This thought is clearly expressed
in Lachance's Case. "Though apparently a robust and vigor-
ous man," said the court of last resort, "Lachance for 2 years
before the accident had had what physicians recognized by its
signs and symptoms, as a cardiac limitation. But this had been
compensated or recovered from temporarily, in nature's way.
The heart was carrying the added load efficiently. A dropsy of
the subcutaneous cellular tissues of the feet and legs had dis-
appeared. The man was working, each following day and bear-
'121 Me. 506, 118 At. 370 (1922).
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ing the heavy burden of a blacksmith's toil, uncomplainingly
and uninterruptedly, to and inclusive of that day just before the
injury. Witnesses speak of his great capacity, till then, for un-
remitting industry. Idleness on his part seems to have been
unknown. Then came an unusual strain with an accompanying
traumatic condition, as the immediate result of what happened
while Lachance was doing what he was employed to do. Soon
afterwards the man was observed by those persons who met him
in his daily walk, to be suffering from breathlessness; also, the
circulation of blood was impaired, due to failure of the aortic
valves to function regularly; . . . His physical failure was
rapid. At the end of scarcely more than five months, he died,
age 56 years. But for the injury, there is nothing to indicate
that the man would not have had an expectancy of life embrac-
ing a period of years."
b.) Successful Medical Treatment or Remission of Infirmity.
Where a pre-existing disorder because of medical treatments
administered to the employee had been prior to the accident
brought out of the danger zone of its culmination, independent
of the employment, there is evidence that the coinciding in-
dustrial accident had proximately caused also an aggravation
cf such disorder, where it is shown that it had become worse
after the accident. In Blair v. Village of Coleraine,'° the em-
ployee, suffering from high-blood pressure, while answering a
fire alarm as a voluntary fireman and riding on a hose truck,
came down stiff-legged and received a jar by reason of misjudg-
ing, the distance when leaving the moving truck, in consequence
of which he suffered a stroke which became manifest about an
hour later. There was evidence that he had been feeling per-
fectly well at the time he responded to that alarm. For about
S months preceding the accident and during all these months
he had been treated for his blood-pressure, and it had been
greatly reduced so that about 2 weeks prior 'to his calamity it
was about normal for a man of his age. Compensation was
awarded and affirmed. However, stress can be laid upon medical
treatment prior to the accident only in the case that the treat-
ment did actually cause some improvement. If the pre-existing
disease be such as could not have been reduced in its hazards at
1 177 Minn. 376, 225 N. W. 284 (1929).
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least temporarily, and if the progress of the disorder could not
have been stopped a reasonable time prior to the accident, the
injured employee could hardly avail himself of such treatment
as evidence of an acceleration of his ailment by reason of his em-
ployment. Length and frequency of treatments, it would seem,
are often quite important circumstances in this connection. On
the other hand, the mere fact that no medical treatment had
been undergone, does not categorically exclude the possibility
of an aggravation of the pre-existing infirmity by reason of the
employment, as there may have taken place a remission of the
disorder sufficiently strong before and at the time of the acci-
dent to warrant the conclusion of the ailment having become
aggravated by reason of the employment. 1
2.) EVIDENTARY FACTS POINTING TO PROBABILITY OF AGGRA-
VATION BY REASON OF EMPLOYMENT.
Other evidentiary facts may point in a positive manner to
the probability of the aggravation of the pre-existing disorder
by reason of the coinciding injury due to the employment.
a.) Termination At Earlier Time Than Reasonably to be
Expected.
The termination of the course of a disorder at an earlier
date than is reasonably to be expected according to the nature
and extent of the ailment and according to the usual and prob-
able course of like or similar disorders may give a clue as to
whether or not the workman's pre-existing condition had been
directly influenced by the industrial accident. As a general
rule, the closer in time of the accident the termination of the
disorder the greater the possibility that the accident at least
hastened or approximately contributed to the final termination.
Where, therefore, a fatal termination issues immediately, or
within a short time, after the occurrence of an accident it may
be assumed that there may have been an aggravation of the
ailment by reason of the employment. Thus, where a steam
crane operator, afflicted with heart disease, became excited and
exhausted from over-exertion when a steam pipe of the crane
broke, so that he died the same day, and where there was medi-
u Compare "Pre-Existing Diseases, Independent of the Employment,
versus Industrial Accidents," Kurt Garve, Illinois Medical Journal,
June, 1933, p. 521 et seq.
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cal expert testimony that over-exertion and excitement had
caused an acute dilation of his heart, there was sufficient evidence
of the proximate contribution of the accident to the speedy fatal
termination of the heart trouble.' 2 In a Pennsylvania case13 the
employee, who prior to his accident had suffered from a sac-like
tumor, filled with some morbid fluid and situated in one of his
abdominal organs, slipped and fell during his employment, in
consequence of which he died soon thereafter. There was medi-
cal testimony of a physician who had been present at the post-
mortem examination, that the employee's fall had caused a rup-
ture of blood vessels surrounding the sac resulting in the escape
of large quantities of blood into the abdominal cavity, that the
rupture had caused in turn the rupture of the sac and the en-
sung death, and that the employee might have lived for many
years notwithstanding his diseased condition. The findings of
the commission that the accident had been the superinducing
cause of the employee's death were upheld on appeal.
Sudden rapid progress of an active disorder which prior to
and up to the time of the accident advanced only gradually, is
also suggestive of an aggravation of a pre-existing disorder by
reason of the employment in absence of any proof of an in.
trinsic clinical cause of an acute exacerbation, independent of
the employment. The longer in time such disease advanced
slowly prior to the employee's calamity and the sooner such
rapid progress appears thereafter, the greater the value of the
inference of causal connection between employment, the indus-
trial vulnerating force which caused the accident and the sud-
den progress of the pre-existing disorder. In Natatini v. Riefler
& Sons, Inc.,14 claimant had been suffering for a number of
years from a progressive nervous disease which up to the time
of his accident had affected only one arm causing the member
to tremble without interfering with his work. He suffered a
severe fall while in the performance of his duties. Since that
time claimant had not done any work because the trembling
thereafter extended to the other arm and his back. It was held
that there was no evidence pointing to a spontaneous flare-up of
his diseased condition.
1Moni v. Carcoal Iron Co. of America, 246 Mich. 193, 224 N. W.
354 (1929).
Guver v. Equitae Gas Go., 279 Pa. 5, 123 A. 590 (1924).
14286 Pa. 301, 133 A. 547 (1926).
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Where the disorder had been arrested, and a reasonable
time after the accident, takes a manifest course of development
towards the employee's disability, the evidence of aggravation
by reason of the employment is still stronger. In Heilemam
Brewing Co. v. Schultz' 5 it appeared that the workman in pre-
vious good health suffered an injury by reason of an explosion
and gas fumes while varnishing a drum. After a few days'
medical treatment he was discharged as well. Immediately
after the accident he complained of throat trouble and for that
reason refused to drink his customary beer at the brewery.
About 10 weeks later the diagnosis of tuberculosis was made,
and the workman died four months after the accident. Physi-
cians testified that the inhalation of gas fumes would furnish
an opportunity for a latent condition at the time of the acci-
dent to become kindled into an active stage, and that, while
usually an infection of the type deceased had been suffering
after the accident would run its course from four to six weeks,
yet it might continue for a period of three to four months. An
award in favor of the widow was affirmed. However, it is es-
sential to discriminate between inactive and active latent dis-
orders. Where the disease has been reasonably quickly progress-
ing in its course prior to the accident, the mere coincidence of
accident and culmination of the pre-existing ailment does not
necessarily point to the accident as the moving cause. Spring
Valley Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, et al.,16 is a good illus-
tration of a counterpart to the Heileman case. The claimant
was struck in his eye by a piece of coal while working in defend-
ant's mine. But the injury was only superficial and did not
reach the interior of his eye, leaving some impairment of vision
but not causing total blindness. Some short time after the em-
ployee had been discharged from medical care, he became totally
blind and it was for this disability that he sotight to recover
compensation. There was medical testimony that there was also
a deep-seated eye ailment which had nothing to do with the
original injury. The employee would have gone blind anyway
in the same length of time because the disease was progressive,
though hidden in its effects to the employee. It could have com-
pleted its course to total blindness within two weeks. An award
161 Wis. 46, 152 N. W. 446 (1915).
'289 I1. 315, 124 N. E. 545 (1919).
KL L. J.-9
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in favor of claimant was reversed. Here we have a latent pre,-
existing disorder which was active and progressing. There was a
phase which was non-manifest, to wit, the phase immediately
preceding total blindness. The period of non-manifestation
coincided in its termination with the reasonably immediate
after-effects of the accident. Thus, no inference of the accident
having influenced the disease can reasonably be drawn in view
of the scientific fact that the disorder might have terminated
in final incapacity at any time. Had the period of non-mani-
festation been given as much longer than the time the super-
ficial injury occurred and its after-effects lasted, no doubt, the
commission would have been justified in concluding that the
accident had accelerated the ailment.
b.) Seat of Manifestation of Disorder Corresponds wit l
Injury.
The seat of the manifestation of the pre-existing disorder
after the accident may also be of value in determining compen-
sable aggravation. Where a vulnerating force due to the em-
ployment attacks a certain part of the employee's body and
thereafter a latent infirmity manifests itself reasonably near
the same place, the suggestion is strong that the injury aggra-
vated the latent condition. Two different situations arise out
of such a set of facts. Where there is a more or less localized
pre-existing ailment and where the vulnerating force is directed
against it or its neighboring tissues, a subsequent appearance of
symptoms of such ailment suggests causal connection. In
Dewees v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., et al.,17 plaintiff, although
apparently in good health and able to work before the accident,
had been suffering from a latent inflammation of the bones and
joints of his spinal column. On the day of the accident he acci-
dentally fell 35 feet and thereby sustained a scalp wound and a
fracture of the bodies of some of the vertebrae. Hospitalization
followed. But soon after having left the hospital an inflamma-
tion of the bones and joints in the location of the previous spinal
column injury developed, resulting in total disability. It was
held that the fall had aggravated the previous condition. And,
where the employee, while performing services for his employer,
received a blow against his right shoulder joint which had prior
to the accident become completely stiffened by reason of a pre-
- 291 Pa. 379, 140 A. 345 (1928).
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existing disease in the nature of a combination of a syphilitic
and tuberculous infection, localized in that joint and arrested,
and where there was evidence that his condition would not have
materially progressed without a new exciting cause, it was held
that the blow immediately lighted up the morbid condition pro-
ducing the incapacity of the employee to work.18 In Slemba V.
William C. Hamilton & Sons, et al.,19 the employee was injured
in his right knee. Shortly thereafter he was taken to a hospital
where his trouble was diagnosed as a malignant tumor with off-
shoots thereof in the lungs. An operation was performed, and
for a while the employee seemed to be doing well, but later he
became worse. He died shortly thereafter. Held that while the
injury did not cause the tumor, yet such an injury as suffered
by deceased could aggravate it and cause its rapid development.
Somewhat complicated is the second situation. The area of
the pre-existing disorder is not localized. There is a primary in-
jury due to the employment. An analysis of this type of cases
shows that there is:
a.) a primary injury due to the employment;
b.) a complex of features of such injury characteristic
thereof;
c.) nothing in such injury to suggest the presence of the
pre-existing ailment immediately or soon after the accident;
But suddenly, after a certain time this primary injury
changes its appearance. It takes on some or all of the traits of
the pre-existing ailment. Is there evidence justifying the as-
sumption that the employment with the original injury had
been the proximate cause of an aggravation of the ailment!
Prima facie, it would seem as though there had taken place the
culmination of the pre-existing infirmity independent of the em-
ployment. The disease merely chose to become manifest in the
place of the original injury. However, it caused a state of
lowered resistance in the tissues near or at the wound. The
underlying pre-existing condition has now an opportunity to
successfully attack the primary injury, thus altering its original
pathologic aspects. As to this spot the pre-existing condition
leaves its state of dormancy and appears to become active and
IBongia~atte v. H. Wales Lines (o., et al., 97 Conn. 548, 117 A.
696 (1922).
1)290 Pa. 267, 138 A. 841 (1927).
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manifest. In F. H. Gi crest Lunber Co. v. Rengler20 the em-
ployee while in the course of his duties was injured by a bundle
of maple flooring which fell against his leg causing a slight
abrasion without breaking the skin. Three days later, owing to
a pre-existing syphilitic infection, an ulcer developed which re-
mained for about a year, thus causing a prolonged disability
for which the employer was held liable. On appeal it was held
that the injury brought about the condition which in turn
caused the disease to become active.
c.) Retardation or Absence of Return to Former State of
HeaLth.
The fact that the injured employee, suffering from a pre-
existing disease, did not return after the accident to his former
state of health, or that such return was greatly retarded, con-
sidering the usual course of injuries of the kind received by
him, is also of great evidentiary value in establishing compen-
sable aggravation of a pre-existing ailment. The strength, ef-
fectiveness of the vulnerating force, and the extent and course
of the primary injury will be controlling. Where a like or simi-
lar injury to a normal person would not have reached the mag-
nitude of disability it did in the case of the employee afflicted
with a pre-existing disorder, and would not have prevented
substantial recovery as it did as to such employee, the suspicion
is strongly justified that the primary injury in fact proximately
caused an aggravation of his pre-existing disorder, in absence
of any showing to the contrary. Similar principles apply to
the case of the employee's recovery being substantially ietarded
beyond the period of time the effects and after-effects of like or
similar accidents or injuries would ordinarily have needed for
their termination. Thus, where the employee, of apparently
previous good health, in the course of his duties lifted and
changed the position of an iron yoke, weighing between 175 to
200 pounds, and while lifting this weight was seized with a
severe pain in the back which he described as a twist, it was held
that he had suffered an accident. He was confined to bed over
a month thereafter, received hospital treatments for some 61
days and at the time of the hearing was in a plaster cast and
still under medical care. There was medical testimony that a
109 Neb. 246, 190 N. W. 578 (1922).
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pre-existing arthritis had been aggravated by the strain.21 The
case is correct in its decision as it is rather uncommon for ordi-
nary strains to be retarded in their healing process for such a
long time and to require plaster casts and hospital treatments
for more than two months, unless there is an inherent infirmity
contributing to the retardation of the course of recovery.
THE LAw OF AGGRAVATION OR ACCELERATION OF PRE-EXISTING
DISORDERS
As a general rule, liability for compensation for an acci-
dent or injury to an employee is imposed upon the employer
only where the servant is performing services growing out of his
employment or such as are incidental thereto, provided the em-
ployee is acting within the scope of his employment, and pro-
vided, further, that the accident or injury is proximately
caused by his employment. Where the disability or death of the
employee arises solely from the disease and independently of
the employment, no recovery may be had. However, by acci-
dents and injuries due to the employment are meant not only
their effects and after-effects, reasonably immediate in time and
remote in time, but also all these effects and after-effects even
though remote in time, of a pre-existing infirmity, which thru
the intervention of the industrial vulnerating force of the em-
ployment have been directly caused. It is the application of the
doctrine of proximate causation to this last consequence which
gives this type of cases and particularly the ease of Maxon v.
Swift & Co. singular features. Defendant's contention that the
long interval of time intervening between injury and death re-
moves the basis of inference of causal connection between them
is, therefore, not well founded in law and of little evidentiary
value, if there is proof to the contrary. However, defendant
company was able to reenforce its contention. In arteriosclerotic
brain disease there is in fact a complex of symptoms which very
much resemble that of the injured employee after he had re-
ceived his injury. "Not infrequently disagreeable subjective
symptoms (headache, vertigo, tinnitus aurium) are associated
with these manifestations. Occasionally the motor weakness is
particularly prominent, and the gait and all other movements
21Hamilton v. Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 298 Pa. 22, 147 A. 837 (1929).
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become slower and more uncertain. The patients frequently
walk with short dragging steps, fall easily, cannot help them-
selves very well, etc. For very evident reasons this condition
is not infrequently associated with true apoplectic attacks of a
light or even of a grave sort. "22 But this theory was counter-
balanced by medical testimony of the claimant widow's medical
experts who were of the opinion that the primary injury at the
time of the accident had caused a slight hemorrhage sufficient to
account for the lack of control of the legs and leaving a weak
spot in the circulatory tree of the arteries of that part of the
brain which showed the later fatal hemorrhage and which
matched with the bump and the fracture of the skull. It was
this version which the commission adopted.
AcCELERATIoN VERSUS ACCIDENT-AmOUNT OF COMPENSATION
An interesting problem arises as to the amount of compen-
sation to be awarded and the degree of injury due to the acci-
dent, where it has caused a primary injury and also aggravated
a pre-existing disorder. As compensation is granted primarily
for the employee's incapacity and is not measured by the extent
of his injuries due to the accident, the question arises whether
the employee should be held liable beyond that part of the dis-
ability which is solely due to the injuries per se and that of the
aggravation caused by the accident, or for the whole incapacity
even though in part due to the disease, independent of the acci-
dent. In Indianapolis Abbatoir Co. v. Coleman23 it was held
that the doctrine of degree of disability prior to the injury, the
degree caused entirely by the accident, and the degree which
might have resulted from the pre-existing infirmity alone is in-
applicable to proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation
Act of the state of Indiana. Where the pre-existing disorder is
such that the person afflicted therewith may be considered for
all practical purposes an individual of substantially average
health and average earning capacity, when compared with other,
normal persons in a like or similar occupation or trade, no doubt,
injuries due to the employment and the ensuing incapacity
could be considered as more than a mere aggravation of a pre-
, "A Text-Book of Medicine," by A. Struempell, 4th American
Eldit., Vol. 2, p. 517 (D. Applefon & Company, New York & London).
2165 Ind. App. 369, 117 N. E. 502 (1917).
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existing disorder. Thus where the pre-existing infirmity was
only light, arrested, or its progress comparatively very slow,
and the incapacity comparatively insignificant, full compensa-
tion should be granted. The same rule might be applied to
cases where the injury was aggravated by the pre-existing dis-
order rather than vice versa. Also, where death results from
the combined action of the vulnerating forces of the accident
and pre-existing disease, one may be inclined to shift the whole
liability upon the employer, even though the disease had been
an active one. But, where the disease is active and progressive
and would have resulted in disability comparatively soon after
the after-effects of the accident were worn off, is it not prejudi-
cial to the employer to compel him to respond in full damages re-
gardless of the final outcome of such active and progressing dis-
order, independent of the injuries due to the employment? Some
states have adopted this view and have enacted statutory rules
of apportionment. In California 24 no apportionment is made in
cases of death, where the injury had been aggravated, or where
the arrested disease had become activated in consequence of the
accident. In Kentucky the court of last resort has gone farther
by applying the rules of apportionment to all cases in which a
pre-existing disorder is involved. In Robinson-Pettet Co. v.
Workmen's Compensation Board, et aL.,25 an employee previously
suffering from tuberculosis of the spine which condition had be-
come dormant, was held entitled to compensation of the disability
due to the fall only, where the fall had reactivated the tubercu-
lous condition. And where an employee while lifting a cable
into its hangers felt a slip in his back and within less than 24
hours was completely paralyzed from his waist down, it was
held that the board decide what percentage of the total dis-
ability was due to the accident and apportion the award, as the
injury had been aggravated by a pre-existing syphilis, both
injury and pre-existing syphilis contributing concurrently to
produce such disability.2 6 In B. F. Avery & Sons v. Carter
27 it
was held that compensation for death proximately contributed
to by a pre-existing diabetes should be apportioned according
27 Cal. Jur. 416/17.
201 Ky. 719, 258 S. W. 318 (1924).
Employers' Liability Assur. Corporation, et al. v. Gardner, et al.,
204 Ky. 216, 263 S. W. 743 (1924).
21205 Kv. 548, 266 S. W. 50 (1924).
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to the contribution of each just as in the case of mere disability
of the employee. The justice of the Kentucky rule becomes
very obvious when one considers such a ease as State ex rel.
Jefferson v. District Court of Ramsey CoU.nty 28 in which the
employee had been crushed under a load of lumber and sustained
several broken ribs and other lesser injuries, and where the
autopsy disclosed that decedent had had pulmonary tuberculosis
in such an advanced stage that one lung had been completely
destroyed and the other one to a considerable extent; also that
he had been suffering from other diseases. Three physicians
testified that in their opinion the employee's death had been
caused by pulmonary tuberculosis and that the injuries which
he had sustained had not been sufficient to cause or hasten his
death. But how is one to apportion the award when the work-
man suffering from high-blood pressure, for instance, had al-
ready been apparently constantly on the brink of a fatal dis-
aster, and yet, according to medical science, might have lived
many years notwithstanding?
One more class of aggravation or acceleration of a pre-ex-
isting infirmity should be mentioned. This is where the injury
is solely due to the culmination of the pre-existing disease and
would not have reached its extent "but for the employment."
In Peoria Ry. Terminal Co. v. IndustriaZ Board, et al.,29 the
servant, while engaged in his duties as a fireman on a train,
fell from the locomotive and was found unconscious thereafter,
dying soon after the accident. A post-mortem showed a
hemorrhage of the brain in a soft spot thereof, due to syphilis,
which had corroded the blood vessels; also that the skull had
been fractured. Held that death resulted from injury by acci-
dent, and that death would not have resulted but for the condi-
tions under which he performed his duties. A majority of courts
have rejected this doctrine.3 0
-138 Minn. 334, 164 N. W. 1012 (1917).
279 Ill. 352, 116 N. E. 651 (1917).
031 Yale Law Review 768, 35 Id. 220.
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